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The Future of Justice Scalia's Predictions of Family
Law Doom
Robert E. Rains*
"State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitu-
tion, masturbation, adultery, fhrnication, bestiality, and obscenity are like-
wise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's deci-
sion. . "-Justice Scalia, dissenting, Lawrence v. Texas.'
"I have seen also in the prophets of Jersalem an horrible thing: they
commit adultery and walk in lies: they strengthen also the hands of evildo-
ers, that none doth return from his wickedness: they are all of them unto me
as Sodom, and the inhabitants thereof as Gomorrah. "--Jeremiah 2 3:14.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has handed down
three groundbreaking decisions concerning the rights of homosexual
persons:3 Romer v. Evans,4Lawrence v. Texas,' and United States v.
Windsor.' Each majority opinion was authored by Justice Kennedy,
and each case featured a vehement dissent by Justice Scalia, with the
overtones of an Old Testament prophet of doom.
In Romer, decided in 1996, the Court struck down a Colorado
constitutional amendment barring the state and its political subdivi-
sions from protecting homosexuals against discrimination. In dissent
Justice Scalia argued that the majority's rationale would mandate the
*Prnfessor Emeritus, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle,
PA. Prof. Rains co-authored an amicus brief to the Supreme Court on behalf of the National
Organization of Social Security Claimants' Representatives and other amici in support of the
respondent in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003).
2. Jeremiah 23:14 (King James).
3. The Court has variously referred to "homosexual persons", "gays and lesbians",
"homosexuals", "homosexual adults", and "homosexual couples."
4. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
6. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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legalization of polygamy. "The Court's disposition today suggests
that these provisions (against polygamy) are unconstitutional, and
that polygamy must be permitted in these States on a state-legislated,
or perhaps even local-option, basis-unless, of course, polygamists
for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than homosexuals."7
In Lawrence in 2003, the Court struck down on due process
grounds a Texas law criminalizing private sexual acts between per-
sons of the same sex.' The Court took the unusual step of explicitly
overruling a fairly recent precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick,' decided sev-
enteen years earlier, which had upheld a Georgia statute criminaliz-
ing "homosexual sodomy" and which also involved private consensual
conduct between two adults.1° The Lawrence majority was careful to
try to limit the scope of the decision:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve per-
sons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in rela-
tionships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not in-
volve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter.
11
Dissenting, Justice Scalia bluntly said:
Do not believe it .... Today's opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made be-
tween heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of
homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state interest" for purposes of
proscribing that conduct,... what justification could there possibly
be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples...
?... This case "does not involve" the issue of homosexual marriage
only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have noth-
ing to do with the decisions of this Court.
12
Justice Scalia additionally argued that the majority's rationale un-
dermined "[s]tate laws against bigamy,... adult incest, prostitution,
7. Romer, 517 U.S. at 648.
8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
9. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986).
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now
is overruled.").
11. Id.
12. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
BYUJouRNAL OF PUBLIc LAW
i ' i t o
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality and obscenity ....
A decade later, in 2013, dissenting from the Court's decision in
United States v. Windsor, striking down Section 3 of the federal De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA) which prohibited the federal gov-
ernment from recognizing same-sex marriages valid under state law,
Justice Scalia issued a similar warning:
In my opinion, however, the view that this Court will take of state
prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond mistaking by
today's opinion. As I have said, the real rationale of today's opin-
ion.., is that DOMA is motivated by "'bare... desire to harm"'
couples in same-sex marriages. How easy it is, indeed how inevita-
ble, to reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying
same-sex couples marital status.
14
He proceeded to quote several paragraphs from the majority
opinion, striking through certain words and substituting others, to
show precisely how the majority opinion could be used to strike
down state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage." He began:
rD.O A'4A!j This state law's principle effect is to identify a subset of
state ane ned marri ages constitutionally protected sexual relation-
ships, see Lawrence, and make them unequal. The principal purpose
is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental ef-
ficiency. Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and
integrity of the person. And DOA this state law contrives to de-
prive some couples married under the lawsfi of their State enjoying
constitutionally protected sexual relationships, but not other couples, of
both rights and responsibilities.
16
He continued:
[DOMA] This state law tells those couples, and all the world, that
their otherwise valid ariages relationships are unworthy of federal
state recognition. This places same-sex couples in an unstable posi-
tion of being in a second-tier ffiaiage relationship. The differentia-
tion demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Con-
stitution protects, see Lawrence,.... 17
Then he provided yet another example to prove his point:
13. Id. at 590.
14. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
15. Id. at 2709-10.
16. Id. at 2710.
17. Id.
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And it humiliates tens-e thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more difficult
for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their
own family and its concord with other families in their community
and in their daily lives.18
This article will consider Justice Scalia's various prophecies of
family law chaos (or progress, depending on one's point of view) and
attempt to draw conclusions as to their validity. It will also raise the
question of whether Justice Scalia may secretly support one or more
of these outcomes he has gone so far to predict.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
"IJ a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of
them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death;
their blood shall be upon them. "--Leviticus 20:13.9
For some fourteen months after the Supreme Court's decision in
Windsor, an unbroken string of federal courts invalidated various state
laws and constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage.2 °
That string was broken on September 3, 2014, by the decision of
District Court Judge Martin Feldman of the Eastern District of Lou-
isiana, who applied the rational basis standard of review to uphold
Louisiana's constitutional and statutory provisions barring same-sex
marriage in Robicheaux v. Caldwell.2 1 Subsequently, the district court
for the District of Puerto Rico in Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla,22 and
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in DeBoer v. Snyder,23 have also
upheld bans on same-sex marriage, although such bans continue to
fall in other jurisdictions, such as in the Ninth Circuit.
24
In the flood of cases successfully challenging state bans on same-
sex marriage decided in the year since Windsor, several district court
judges have used Justice Scalia's words, with apparent relish, as sup-
porting ammunition to invalidate such laws. Thus, for example, in
18. Id.
19. Leviticus 20:13 (King James). Your author has not been able to find a similar biblical
admonition against a woman lying down with another woman.
20. See Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 916 n.6 (E.D. LA. 2014).
21. See id.
22. Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 150487 (D.P.R. 2014).
23. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cit. 2014).
24. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
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Kitchen v. Herbert, striking down Utah's same-sex marriage ban,
Judge Robert J. Shelby quoted from Justice Scalia's dissent in Wind-
sor and then opined, "The court agrees with Justice Scalia's interpre-
tation of Windsor and finds that the important federalism concerns at
issue here are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition
that denies the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protec-
tion under the law."25 Judge Shelby continued, "The court therefore
agrees with the portion of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Law-
rence in which Justice Scalia stated that the Court's reasoning logical-
ly extends to protect an individual's right to marry a person of the
same sex. . ." and proceeded to quote the language from Justice Scal-
ia's Lawrence dissent set forth above.26
In a similar vein, federal district court judges in Ohio,27 Oklaho-
ma,28 Kentucky,29 Virginia," Texas,31 Idaho,32 Wisconsin," and Flor-
ida,34 have all cited Justice Scalia's dissents in Lawrence and/or Wind-
sor to buttress their opinions striking down same-sex marriage bans in
those states.
Unsurprisingly, the only federal judges addressing these issues
post-Windsor who have, or would have, upheld a ban on same-sex
marriage, have found no occasion to cite the language in Justice Scal-
ia's dissents that the rationales of Lawrence and Windsor mandate the
striking down of state law bans on same-sex marriage. Circuit Court
Judge Kelly, dissenting in the Tenth Circuit's affirmance in Kitchen,
did not do so. 3 Circuit Court Judge Niemeyer, dissenting in the
25. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (D. Utah 2013), affd 755 F.3d 1193
(10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S.Ct. 265 (2014).
26. Id. at 1204.
27. Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 n.l (S. D. Ohio 2013).
28. Bishop v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1277-78, 1295 (N. D. Okla. 2014),
affid sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v.
Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).
29. Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 n.14 (W.D. Ky 2014), rev'd by DeBoer
v. Snyder, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 21191 (6th Cif. 2014).
30. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014), affd sub nom. Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286
(2014), McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014), Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014).
31. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 655 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
32. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
33. Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 2014), affd sub nom. Baskin
v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, cert. denied, sub nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014), Walker v.
Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
34. Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1290 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
35. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1230-40 (10th Cir. 2014) (KellyJ, dissenting).
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Fourth Circuit,36 and District Court Judge Feldman, upholding Loui-
siana's ban in Robicheaux, failed to do so.37 Neither did Judge P6rez-
Gim6nez in Conde-Vidal38 nor Judges Sutton or Cook in DeBoer.39
In effect, through his dissents, Justice Scalia has provided a road
map for advocates advancing a position of which he apparently does
not approve, i.e., that the Constitution requires states to allow same-
sex couples to marry. Indeed, elsewhere in his Windsor dissent, he ex-
pressly disavowed that view: "It is enough to say that the Constitu-
tion neither requires nor prohibits our society to approve of same-sex
marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve no-
fault divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol."'
Our great national debate over same-sex marriage is, of course,
far from being resolved. In early October 2014, the Supreme Court
surprised many observers41 by denying certiorari in all seven petitions
presented to it seeking review of circuit court decisions striking down
same-sex marriage bans in Utah,42 Oklahoma,4 3 Virginia,44 Indiana,
and Illinois. 45 But, at that time, there was no circuit split of authority
on the issue. With the subsequent DeBoer decision in the Sixth Cir-
cuit, that split now exists.46 Accordingly, in January 2015, the Court
granted cert in Deboer and its consolidated cases limited to the follow-
ing questions:
1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a
marriage between two people of the same sex?
2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize
a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage
36. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014).
37. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014).
38. Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150487 (D.P.R. 2014).
39. DeBoer v. Snyder, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 21191 (6th Cir. 2014).
40. U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2707 (2013).
41. See Lyle Denniston, Same-sex Marriage Cases Set for Early Look , SCOTUSBLOG,
(Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/09/same-sex-marriage-cases-set-for-early-
look/; (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Adam Liptak, Justices Embark on Road to a Ruling on Same-Sex
Marriage, TilE NEW YORK TIMEs, Sept. 29, 2014.
42. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
43. Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014).
44. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014).
45. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
46. It has been reported that Justice Ginsburg told an audience at the University of
Minnesota Law School in September 2014 that there was "no need for us to rush" into the issue
at that time because there was no circuit split on the subject. Greg Stohr, Gay Marriage Cleared
in New States After High Court Rebuff, BNA FAMILY LAW REPORTER, Vol. 40. No. 46 at 1583,
Oct. 17, 2014.
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was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?47
Of course, even if the Court decides these most important issues
on the merits and speaks with great clarity, that would not likely re-
solve our national debate on the subject, any more than the unani-
mous decision in Brown v. Board of Education, made six decades ago,
has lain to rest issues of segregation in public education,4" or Roe v.
Wade,0 four decades ago, has quieted our national disputes over
abortion.s
III. POLYGAMY/BIGAMY
"But King Solomon loved many strange women.., and be bad 700
wives, princesses, and three hundred concubines: and his wives turned away
his heart. "--I Kings 11:1-352
In his dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia warned that the Court was
undermining state prohibitions against polygamy when it struck
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution barring state or
local actions prohibiting discrimination against persons with "homo-
sexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relation-
ships."53 Similarly, in his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia argued that,
State laws against bigamy ... are likewise sustainable only in light
of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single
one of these laws is called into question by today's decision; the
Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude
them from its holding.
54
This raises many questions. Does the logic of the majority opin-
ion in either Romer or Lawrence truly mandate state recognition of
polygamy? Are prohibitions on polygamy based solely on "moral
47. DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 14-571, 2015 WL 213650 (6th Cir. 2014); Obergefell v.
Hodges.No. 14-556, 2015 WL 213646 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Tanco v. Haslam, No. 14-562, 2015
WL 213648; Bourke v. Beshear, No. 14-574, 2015 WL 213651 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. See Thomas v. School Bd. St. Martin Parish, 756 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2014); Lewis v.
Ascension Parish School Bd., 996 F. Supp. 2d 450 (M.D. La. 2014).
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. See Planned Parenthood of Arizona v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2014).
52. 1 Kings 11:1-3 (KingJames). This may be one of the earliest recorded cases illustrat-
ing the doctrine of assumption of risk.
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996) (see text accompanying n.7).
54. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003).
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choices," or do such prohibitions serve other functions? To what ex-
tent, if any, have Justice Scalia's predictions (now almost two decades
old in the case of Romer) proven to be correct?
Has Justice Scalia created a false analogy? In Romer, the Court
did not require Colorado or its local governments to have or enact
statutes or ordinances protecting homosexuals from discrimination.
Rather, the Court struck down a state constitutional amendment
prohibiting the enactment of such protections. Indeed it is instructive
that, to this day, the Human Relations Act in the author's state
(Pennsylvania) still does not include homosexuals as a class protected
from discrimination," and all efforts to enact such protection have
failed.56 One would expect that if Romer truly mandated the enact-
ment of state and local laws protecting homosexuals from discrimina-
tion, the omission of homosexuals from coverage under Pennsylva-
nia's anti-discrimination statute would have long since been
successfully challenged as unconstitutional. Similarly, sexual minori-
ties are not protected under either Title V17 or Title VIP8 of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Under the doctrine of Bolling v. Sharpe,5 9 one
would expect that if Romer mandated that states enact anti-
discrimination legislation for homosexuals, that mandate would ex-
tend to the federal government as well. So, if Romer does not create a
positive obligation on states to protect homosexuals (the actual sub-
ject of the decision) from discrimination, it is difficult to see how it
can realistically be interpreted to require state and local authorities to
enact laws prohibiting discrimination against polygamists (who were
not the subject of the case).
It is to be expected that litigants seeking to enter into polygamous
marriages and persons charged with violating state laws against po-
lygamy would use any available legal ammunition in support of their
position. If Romer actually provided strong support for those advocat-
ing a right to plural marriage, one would naturally expect such advo-
cates to raise the Romer issue in litigation. Yet that has not proven to
be the case, and, to date, these advocates have been uniformly unsuc-
55. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. 955.
56. See, e.g., Monica Disare, In the Northeast, only Pa. Lacks Law on Discrimination by Sex-
ual Orientation, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETT'E, July 29, 2013, available at http:www.post-
gazette.com/news/state/2013/07/29/In-the-Northeast-only-Pa-lacks-law-on-discrimination-
by-sexual-orientation/stories/201307290195 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
58. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
59. Bollingv. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
360
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cessful.
The United States has a long history of the prohibition of plural
marriage being upheld by the courts. Usually, the issue asserted by
proponents is religious liberty rather than nondiscrimination. Well
over a century ago, in 1878, the Supreme Court rejected such a claim
in Reynolds v. United States, reasoning that religious belief cannot "be
accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of
the land."6"' A hundred years later, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals rejected multiple claims of a city police officer in Utah, Royston
Potter, that his dismissal for the practice of polygamy violated his
constitutional rights.61 Potter asserted the "equal footing" doctrine
(that all states are equal in power, dignity, and authority), the Free
Exercise clause, the right to privacy, and "laws in desuetude," none of
which were given traction by the court.62
The Utah Supreme Court revisited the issue of polygamy in 2004
in. a criminal case, State v. Green.63 Thomas Green raised thirty-
nine(!) issues on appeal to that court, but because he failed to ade-
quately brief most of them, the court did not even bother to list them
all.64 In affirming his conviction for bigamy, the Court only addressed
his constitutional claims of free exercise of religion and vagueness.
There is no indication that Green relied on either Romer or Lawrence
in any way. Significantly, the Court found many public policy reasons
for prohibiting plural marriage other than moral disapproval.
Most importantly, Utah's bigamy statute serves the State's inter-
est in protecting vulnerable individuals from exploitation and abuse.
The practice of polygamy, in particular, often coincides with crimes
targeting women and children. Crimes not unusually attendant to the
practice of polygamy include incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and
failure to pay child support.6"
The court noted that in addition to his bigamy conviction,
Green was also convicted of criminal nonsupport and rape of a
child, Linda Kunz, who was thirteen years old at the time of her
first sexual association with Green. The potential for conflicts of
consanguinity in polygamous associations is illustrated by Green's
60. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878).
61. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985).
62. Id. at 1067.
63. State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (2004).
64. Id. at 824.
65. Id. at 830.
3531
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relationships. Among Green's 'wives' are three sets of sisters and
three of his own stepdaughters.
66
The Utah Supreme Court had occasion to revisit these issues two
years later, in 2006, in State v. Holm, yet another case of a polygamist
who had entered into marital relationships with siblings, one of
whom was a minor.6 7 Although Holm did not apparently raise a de-
fense under Romer, he did assert that Lawrence insulated his plural
marriage from state condemnation.68 The Court readily distinguished
Lawrence on its own terms. Lawrence was explicitly limited to private
sexual conduct between adults.69 In contrast, "this case implicates the
public institution of marriage, an institution the law protects, and al-
so involves a minor."7 The Court noted that there had already been
over forty unsuccessful attempts by litigants to expand Lawrence be-
yond its scope.71 Interestingly, the Utah Chief Justice dissented in
part and asserted that Lawrence does protect the right to plural mar-
riage.72
The Utah Supreme Court's two recent, post-Romer and Lawrence
decisions upholding Utah's bigamy statute have not ended the legal
battle in Utah. In light of the airing of a so-called "reality program"
named "Sister Wives" on The Learning Channel, Utah state officials
began an investigation of the Browns, the plural family featured on
that show. In response, the Browns brought a lawsuit, Brown v.
Buhman, in the U.S. district court for Utah,73 challenging the consti-
tutionality of Utah's bigamy statute7 4 on various grounds. In a
lengthy opinion that frequently cites Lawrence (but not Romer), Dis-
trict Court Judge Clark Waddoups struck down that part of the Utah
statute that criminalized "cohabitation," including the situation
where a married person "cohabits with another person."7 5 The court
based this holding on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment (which was not at issue in Lawrence),76 a substantive due process
66. Id. at n.14.
67. State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 730 (2006).
68. Id. at 742.
69. Id. at 743.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 742-43.
72. Id. at 776-79.
73. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
74. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (West 2014).
75. Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
76. Id. at 1221.
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right to consensual sexual privacy as interpreted by Lawrence,77 and
vagueness under the due process clause (also not at issue in Law-
rence).78
Judge Waddoups also ruled that these constitutional restraints
required that the court give a narrowing construction to that part of
the bigamy statute that makes it a crime when a married person "pur-
ports to marry another person."'" As narrowed by Judge Waddoups,
"the statute remains in force, submitting anyone residing in Utah,
knowing he has a wife or she has a husband or knowing the other
person has a wife or husband, to prosecution for the crime of bigamy
for entering into a further purportedly legal union."8 The statute
does not reach persons who enter into "religious cohabitation" which
occurs when "those who choose to live together without getting mar-
ried enter into a personal relationship that resembles a marriage in its
intimacy but claims no legal sanction."81 Thus, the Brown plaintiffs
and those similarly situated choose "'to enter into a relationship that
[they know] would not be legally recognized as marriage, [they use]
religious terminology to describe this relationship,' and this termi-
nology-'marriage' and 'husband and wife'-happens to coincide
with the terminology used by the state to describe the legal status of
married persons."'82
Judge Waddoups entered his judgment in Brown, now recap-
tioned Brown v. Herbert, on August 27, 2014,83 and the state filed its
notice of appeal on September 24, 2014.84 It seems highly doubtful
that Judge Waddoups' application of Lawrence to these plaintiffs will
be upheld. His Lawrence analysis appears much weaker than the free
exercise and vagueness underpinnings of the judgment. As Judge
Waddoups repeatedly noted, Lawrence protects private consensual
sexual conduct. For example, he acknowledged, "Lawrence's discus-
sion about the Fourteenth Amendment's commitment to a concept of
77. Id. at 1222-23.
78. Id. at 1225-26.
79. Id. at 1226-34.
80. Id. at 1233-34.
81. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
82. Id. (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 773 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C. J. dissent-
ing)).
83. Brown v. Herbert, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120441 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2014).
84. Ben Winslow, Utah Will Appeal Polygamy Ruling, FoX 13, Sept. 24, 2014, 11:30 pm
http://fox13now.com/2014/09/24/utah-will-appeal-polygamy-ruling/ (last visited March 14,
2015).
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liberty that 'protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places."'85 It is difficult to per-
ceive what privacy is involved with relationships which the Brown
plaintiffs have seen fit to broadcast on a nationally syndicated televi-
sion show or how they could possibly have standing to assert any pri-
vacy argument.
Even if Judge Waddoups' decision striking down the cohabitation
prong and narrowing the "purports to marry" prong of Utah's polyg-
amy statute should stand on appeal, that would still leave Utah's per se
prohibition on bigamy/polygamy in place notwithstanding Romer and
Lawrence, although, admittedly, harder to prosecute. But, Lawrence
might well be read to prohibit the criminalization of private intimate
cohabitation by a married person with someone other than his or her
spouse, a topic better addressed below under adultery.
IV. ADULTERY
"And David sent and enquired after the woman. And one said, Is not
this Bathsheba, the daughter of Eliam, the wife of Uriah the Hittite? And
David sent messengers and took her; and she came in unto him, and he lay
with her; for she was purified from her uncleanness: and she returned unto
her house. And the woman conceived, and sent and told David, and said, I
am with child. "--2 Samuel 11:3-5"
As noted, Justice Scalia argued in dissent that Lawrence called into
question state laws against adultery." While not explicit, it appears
that he was referencing state criminal prohibitions rather than civil
statutes addressing adultery in the context of domestic relations. As-
suming that is correct, then Justice Scalia is also correct: state laws
criminalizing adultery committed in privacy are surely doomed to be
consigned to the scrap heap of history. Yet, rather astonishingly,
more than a half century after the Kinsey Reports found that very
large percentages of married men and women self-reported engaging
in adultery,"8 almost half of all states continue to maintain on their
85. Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562
(2003)).
86. 2 Samuel 11:3-5 (KingJames).
87. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003).
88. ALFRED C. KINSEY, ET AL., SEXUAL BEFHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE, 584-89 (W.
B. Saunders Co., Phila. & London, 1948) (27% to 37% of married males in any given 5-year
period); ALFRED C. KINSEY, ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FFMALE, 416-18 (W.
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books, although most do not actually prosecute, the crime of adul-
tery.
89
The crime of adultery is defined and categorized in different ways
in different states. The Utah Criminal Code defines adultery thus:
"A married person commits adultery when he voluntarily has sexual
intercourse with a person other than his spouse."9  Accordingly it ap-
pears that in Utah if a married person has sex with an unmarried per-
son, only the married person has committed adultery, although the
unmarried person will have committed the crime of fornication.9' By
contrast, Michigan law states that when adultery "is committed be-
tween a married woman and a man who is unmarried, the man shall
be guilty of adultery, and liable to the same punishment."'2 Apparent-
ly in Michigan an unmarried woman who has sex with a married man
does not share his culpability.3 Perhaps the Michigan legislature
simply did not contemplate that any unmarried Michigan woman
would engage in such behavior. The Michigan statute also conflates
cohabitation with adultery under one particular circumstance: "If any
persons after being divorced from the bonds of matrimony for any
cause whatever, shall cohabit together, they shall be liable to all the
penalties provided by law against adultery."94 In South Carolina,
adultery requires more than a single act of intercourse. Rather, "adul-
tery is the living together and carnal knowledge with each other or
habitual carnal intercourse with each other without living together of
a man and a woman when either is lawfully married to some other
person.'""5 The term "habitual" is not defined, but it would appear
that a married person who has a series of "one night stands" with dif-
ferent partners cannot be prosecuted under this statute.
Punishments also vary widely. In Utah, adultery is a class B mis-
demeanor.96 Since fornication is also a class B misdemeanor in
B. Saunders Co., Phila. & London, 1953) (26% of married females by age 40).
89. See Ethan Bronner, Adultery , an Ancient Crime That Remains on Many Books, N.Y.
TIMPS, Nov. 14, 2012, h-tp://,,v.ny-imcs.com/2012/lI/15/us/aduliery-an-ancient-crime-
still-on-many-books.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (reporting that adultery remained a
crime in Virginia and 22 other states as of Nov. 2012).
90. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103 (2014).
91. Id. § 76-7-104.
92. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.30 (2014).
93. See id.
94. Id. § 750.32. This provision is in direct conflict with current public policy in most
jurisdictions to encourage reconciliation. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STIAT. § 3102(a)(2) (2014).
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-70(2013).
96. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2014).
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Utah,97 the unmarried sex partner of the married person potentially
faces equal punishment. Class B misdemeanors are punishable by a
fine of up to $1,000 and/or imprisonment of up to six months.98 In
South Carolina, the guilty adulterer can be fined $100 to $500 or im-
prisoned for six months to one year, or both fined and imprisoned.99
At the other end of the spectrum, in Michigan adultery is a felony."' °
Even more remarkably, in Michigan, in the 2006 case of People v.
Waltonen, the appeals court ruled that adultery would also constitute
"criminal sexual conduct in the first degree," making it theoretically
punishable by life in prison.01 Michigan law, however, contains a sig-
nificant limitation on prosecution: "No prosecution for adultery...
shall be commenced, but on the complaint of the husband or wife.
1 2
At the time of the Waltonen decision, the Prosecuting Attorneys As-
sociation of Michigan noted that no one had been convicted of adul-
tery in Michigan since 1971, more than a third of a century earlier. 
1 03
What could possibly be the purpose of statutes, which are virtual-
ly never enforced, which criminalize behavior that at one time or an-
other is engaged in by possibly a majority of the married, adult popu-
lation (and those who engage in it with them)? To give just two
prominent examples of the efficacy of such statutes, consider former
South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford and former Michigan Attor-
ney General Mike Cox. The then married Sanford, whose famous
"hike on the Appalachian Trail" turned out to be a tryst with his Ar-
gentinian mistress, Maria Belen Chapur, left the governorship in dis-
grace in 2011, only to be elected to the U.S. House of Representa-
tives in 2013, with Ms. Chapur standing proudly by his side." 4
97. Id. § 76-7-104.
98. Id. §§ 76-3-301 and 76-3-204.
99. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60.
100. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.30 (2014).
101. See People v. Waltonen, 728 N.W.2d 881, 890 n.8 (Mich. App. 2006); MiCHi. COMi'.
LAWS § 750.520b. See also Brian Dickerson, Adultery Could Mean Life, Court Finds, DETROIT
FREI PRESS (Jan. 14, 2007, 10:00 PM), http://archive.freep.com/article/20070115/COL04/
701150333/Adultery-could-mean-life-court-fLnds; http://webarchive.org/web/20070206173058/;
http://freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070115/COL04/701150333 (last visited Mar.
14, 2015).
102. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.31.
103. Dickerson supra, note 101.
104. Kim Severson, Looking Past Sex Scandal, South Carolina Returns Ex-Governor to Con-
gress, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/south-carolina-
election-a-referendum-on-sanford.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Adam Edelman, South
Carolina Rep. Sanford's Argentinian Fiance Opens Up About their Affair, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct.
20, 2013 1:52 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/south-carolina-rep-mark-
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Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox, whose office took the Walto-
nen case to the court of appeals, had himself confessed to an adulter-
ous relationship, thus theoretically making him eligible for a sentence
of life imprisonment. 15
There is no real evidence that criminal adultery statutes actually
deter adultery. A married person who is not afraid of the conse-
quences at home of his or her infidelity is hardly likely to be seriously
afraid of prosecution under a statute that he likely does not know still
exists as it is never, or hardly ever, prosecuted. If such statutes are in-
tended to express mere moral condemnation, do the (highly theoreti-
cal) punishments fit the "crime" and societal attitudes? If such crimi-
nal statutes were to be actually prosecuted today, would they not be
subject to challenge as having fallen into desuetude and being subject
to the worst possible prosecutorial discretion? It may be politically
difficult for a politician to stand up and publically announce that she
wants to repeal the crime of adultery and thereby risk the charge of
being in favor of such behavior.106 Where this is politically infeasible,
has the Court notdone the sensible thing in Lawrence by ruling that
the state cannot constitutionally criminalize private, non-commercial,
consensual sexual behavior between adults?
V. FORNICATION
"But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found for
the damsel: Then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of the father's
house, and the men of' her city shall stone her with stones that she die: be-
cause she hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the whore in her father's
house: so shalt thou put evil away from among you. "-Deuteronomy
22:20-2 1107
Justice Scalia's expressed fear in his Lawrence dissent that the ma-
sanford-argentinian-fiancee-opens-affair-article-1.1490958. (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). Not
too surprisingly, Rep. Sanford later announced, on Facebook no less, that he had broken up
with his Argentinian "true love." See Alan Rappeport, Mark Sanford Announces a Breakup on Fa-
cebook, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/us/sanford-calls-off-
engagement-on-facebook.html. (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
105. Dickerson supra, note 101.
106. See Bronner, supra, note 88. ("A number of law professors, including Joanna L.
Grossman of Hofstra University, said one reason that adultery laws remain on the books is that
getting rid of them would require politicians to declare their opposition to them, something few
would do.")
107. Deuteronomy 22:20-21 (KingJames).
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jority's opinion would spell the death knell of state laws criminalizing
the act of fornication was sound. But it does not tell the whole story.
Such laws were already under well-deserved attack before the Law-
rence decision. Nevertheless, a number of states still maintain them
on the books although they are seldom prosecuted.
The laws themselves, a strange admixture, are mostly-but not
entirely-in southern states.The usual rule, as in Utah,"8 Idaho,'09
and Virginia,"' is that fornication is sexual intercourse between two
unmarried persons. But in South Carolina, "'Fornication' is the living
together and carnal intercourse with each other or habitual carnal in-
tercourse with each other without living together of a man and a
woman, both being unmarried.""' While the term, "habitual," is not
defined, this section would appear to permit individual, or infrequent,
non-commercial, private sex acts between consenting adults. North
Carolina's statute, which combines fornication and adultery, states,
"If any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewd-
ly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be
guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor: Provided, that the admissions or
confessions of one shall not be received in evidence against the oth-
er."112 The use of the conjunctive "and" suggests that the crime re-
quires the couple to associate, bed, and cohabit together, thus per-
mitting non-cohabiting private, consensual sexual conduct.
Mississippi's statute, a masterpiece of internal inconsistency, pro-
vides, "If any man and woman shall unlawfully cohabit, whether in
adultery or fornication, they shall be fined in any sum not more than
five hundred dollars each, and imprisoned in the county jail not more
than six months; and it shall not be necessary to constitute the of-
fense, that the parties dwell together as husband and wife, but it may
be proved by circumstances that show habitual sexual intercourse.""'
Thus sexual cohabitation is criminal, whether or not it involves co-
habitation. However, non-habitual intercourse between non-
cohabiting consenting adults does not run afoul of the law.
As noted, state statutes criminalizing fornication were under at-
tack before Lawrence. Most interesting is the example of Georgia. It
108. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-104 (2014).
109. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6603 (2014).
110. VA. Code Ann. § 18.2-344(2006).
111. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-80 (1976).
112. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-184 (1994).
113. Miss. Code Ann. §97-29-1 (2014).
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was Georgia's anti-sodomy law that was upheld in the U.S. Supreme
Court against federal constitutional attack in 1986 in Bowers v. Hard-
wick," 4 the case that Lawrence overturned in 2003."' In the interim
between those two decisions, the Georgia Supreme Court struck
down that same anti-sodomy law in 1998 in the case of Powell v. State,
as violating the Georgia constitution's right to privacy.116 Then in
January 2003, five months before the Lawrence decision, the Georgia
Supreme Court, relying on Powell, struck down the state's criminal
fornication statute in In re J.M."7 Again the Georgia Court ruled that
the Georgia Constitution "protects from criminal sanction private,
unforced non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy between persons
legally able to consent.""'
Of course, the Lawrence decision also has had an impact on state
fornication laws. In 2005, in direct reliance on Lawrence, the Virginia
Supreme Court in the case of Martin v. Ziherl struck down that
state's statute criminalizing fornication."' The Martin Court was at
pains to limit the scope of its decision:
It is important to note that this case does not involve minors, non-
consensual activity, prostitution, or public activity. The Lawrence
court indicated that state regulation of that type of activity might
support a different result. Our holding, like that of the Supreme
Court in Lawrence, addresses only private, consensual conduct be-
tween adults .... Our holding does not affect the Commonwealth's
police power regarding regulation of public fornication, prostitu-
tion, or other such crimes.'
2
0
The asserted facts in Martin demonstrate the kind of cynicism
that such a statute can encourage. According to the pleadings, an
adult man and woman carried on an intimate sexual relationship for
two years, during which the man infected the woman with herpes.'
12
She brought a tort action alleging that he knew he had herpes, knew
it was contagious, and failed to inform her of his condition. 22 The
114. Bowers v. Hardwich, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
115. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003).
116. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
117. In reJ.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ga. 2003).
118. Id. at 442.
119. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
120. Id. at 371.




man filed a demurrer in which he argued that because the woman had
engaged in the criminal act of fornication, she could not recover
damages caused by her own illegal action.123 The trial court granted
the demurrer. 124 The man's own criminal acts (for which, of course,
he was not prosecuted) did not matter; her crime of having had sex
with him was dispositive12 ' Reasonably enough, the Virginia Su-
preme Court reversed by striking down the criminal fornication stat-
ute, thereby allowing the lawsuit to proceed.1
26
Whatever the state definition of fornication, such an act-not
uncommon in our society- conducted in private, between consent-
ing adults, on a non-commercial basis, is quite properly not the sub-
ject of state criminal laws. This is not to argue against marriage, or
against raising children in marriage, or for single parent households;
rather it is an acceptance of reality and the proper limits of the law.
VI. ADULT INCEST
"If there is a man who lies with his father's wife, he has uncovered his
father's nakedness; both of them shall surely he put to death, their
hloodguiltiness is upon them.... If there is a man who marries a woman
and her mother, it is immorality; both he and they shall be burned with fire,
so that there is no immorality in your midst."-Leviticus 20:11, 14.127
Justice Scalia likewise argued in his Lawrence dissent that the de-
cision would undermine state laws against adult incest. This author
can find no documented case in which this fear has materialized.
Incest, like fornication, has no one universal definition. The
states are not in agreement as to what constitutes incest, and the dif-
ferent statutes reveal distinct underlying purposes.
For example, in Pennsylvania one commits the crime of adult in-
cest "if that person knowingly marries or cohabits or has sexual inter-
course with an ancestor or descendant, a brother or sister of the
whole or half blood or an uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole
blood.1 28 Moreover, "[t]he relationships.. .include blood relation-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 368.
126. Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
127. Leviticus 20:11, 14 (New American Standard Bible).
128. 18 P.A. CONS. STAT. § 4302(a) (2012).
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ships without regard to legitimacy, and relationship of parent and
child by adoption."'29 Thus it appears that sexual intercourse between
adopted brother and sister who have no blood relationship is not a
crime in Pennsylvania, which suggests that preservation of harmony
within the nuclear family unit is not the primary concern of the stat-
ute. There are no exceptions in either the marriage law or the crimi-
nal incest statute for those who are sterile, which suggests that fear of
genetic aberrations also is not a sole motivator. Further complicating
the picture, the criminal prohibition is not coextensive with the de-
grees of consanguinity set forth in the Domestics Relations Code,
which constitute a bar to issuance of a marriage license. Thus, no
marriage license may be issued to first cousins in Pennsylvania,13 but
neither marriage nor cohabitation nor sexual intercourse between
first cousins constitutes a crime. Moreover, a marriage entered into in
violation of the consanguinity rules is either voidable' or void,132
depending on which section of the Domestic Relations Code one
reads. Finally, Pennsylvania law is silent on the extraterritorial effect
of its consanguinity prohibitions. In 2005, two first cousins residing
in Pennsylvania, and unable to get married in that state, travelled to
Maryland where first cousin marriage is legal, were married there,
and immediately returned to continue residing in Pennsylvania.'33
Whether their marriage is valid in Pennsylvania is an open question.
In Wisconsin, by contrast, the crime of incest is directly linked to
marriage prohibitions based on consanguinity. Thus, the crime of in-
cest is defined as follows: "Whoever marries or has nonmarital sexual
intercourse... with a person he or she knows is a blood relative and
such relative is related in a degree within which the marriage of the
parties is prohibited by the law of this state is guilty of a Class F felo-
ny.' 134 In turn, the relevant Wisconsin marriage law prohibition pro-
vides:
No marriage shall be contracted... between parties who are nearer
in kin than 2nd cousins except that marriage may be contracted be-
129. Id. § 4302(c).
130. 23 P.A. CONS. STAT. § 1304(e) (2014).
131. d.§ 1703.
132. Id. § 3304(a)(2).
133. See Fredrick Kunkle, Pa. Cousins Try to Overcome Taboo of" 'I Do' , WASHINGTON
Posr, Apr. 25, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2005/04/24/AR2005042401406.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
134. WIs. STrAT. § 944.06 (2009).
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tween first cousins where the female has attained the age of 55 years
or where either party, at the time of application for a marriage li-
cense, submits an affidavit signed by a physician stating that either
party is permanently sterile. Relationship under this section shall be
computed by the rule of the civil law, whether the parties to the
marriage are of the half or of the whole blood.'35
The Wisconsin consanguinity prohibition applies even if the
Wisconsin resident contracts the marriage out of state, intending to
return to Wisconsin.'
36
It appears that, as far as it applies to first cousins, the Wisconsin
marriage prohibition and hence the crime of incest, is based on a fear
of genetic defects in the offspring, inasmuch as first cousins are per-
mitted to marry if the woman is over 55 or either party is medically
certified to be permanently sterile. Thus, as far as the first cousin
prohibition, the rationale is not a societal incest taboo or fear of a de-
structive relationship within the extended family.
As predicted by Justice Scalia, this statute has indeed been at-
tacked on a Lawrence theory, but as one would expect from the major-
ity opinion in Lawrence, that attack failed. In Muth v. Frank,1' a case
with a complicated procedural history, two siblings managed to get
married and produced three children, at least one of whom was re-
moved from them.138 Their parental rights to that child were subse-
quently terminated, and they were both prosecuted for and convicted
of incest.'39 Subsequently, the man brought a federal habeus corpus pe-
tition challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin's incest statute
based on an expanded reading of Lawrence.' The district court de-
nied that petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.14' The appellate
court reasoned that Muth was not a beneficiary of the rule Lawrence
announced: "Lawrence... did not announce, as Muth claims it did, a
fundamental right, protected by the Constitution, for adults to en-
gage in all manner of consensual sexual conduct, specifically in this
case, incest.' 42
135. Id. § 765.03.
136. Id. § 765.04.
137. Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
138. ld. at 810.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 818.
142. Id. at 817.
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It is highly doubtful that Lawrence will affect state criminal incest
statutes or consanguinity restrictions on marriage, but it is an open
question whether the remaining state prohibitions on first cousin
marriage or intercourse are warranted. While that matter is beyond
the scope of this article, it is interesting to note that quite a fair num-
ber of prominent and highly intelligent people, including Charles
Darwin 143 and Albert Einstein,"4 have married their first cousins.
Fortunately for Darwin and Einstein, neither resided in Wisconsin.
VII. PROSTITUTION
"If a priest's daughter defiles herself by becoming a prostitute, she dis-
graces her father; she must be burned in the fire. "--Leviticus 21:9145
Justice Scalia's argument that Lawrence undercuts criminal prosti-
tution laws has been raised several times by criminal defendants
charged with prostitution or related offenses, but, thus far at least,
has failed.
In 2004, less than a year after Lawrence, Donna L. Williams ap-
pealed her second prostitution conviction, asserting that her actions
were protected under Lawrence.'46 In a brief decision, the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Third District, readily distinguished the rationale of
Lawrence:
"Williams' reliance on the Lawrence decision is misplaced. Wil-
liams characterizes her conduct as private sexual activity between two
consenting adults. As the State argues, however, Williams' activity is
more aptly described as the commercial sale of sex. The Lawrence
Court specifically excluded prostitution from its analysis."'
' 47
In 2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas, reject-
ed a similar claim involving a motion to quash a bill of information
for soliciting an undercover officer to engage in "unnatural oral
copulation for compensation.' ' 14' The trial court had agreed with the
defendant that her commercial activity was protected by Lawrence,
143. PAUlJOHNSON, CHARLES DARWIN: PORTRAIT OF A GENIUS 49-50 (2012). The
couple produced 10 children.
144. WAIATER ISAACSON, EINSTEIN: HIS LIFE AND UNIVERSI, 172 (2007).
145. Leviticus 21:9 (New International Version).
146. People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
147. Id. at 1199.
148. State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (La. 2005).
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but the state supreme court unanimously reversed, citing the Law-
rence majority's specific disclaimer that the decision addressed prosti-
tution.
149
In 2006, an Arizona appeals court summarily rejected a similar
challenge raised by a man charged with soliciting an act of prostitu-
tion in State v. Freitag.5 That same year, a federal district court in
Indiana likewise rejected a similar defense to federal charges of in-
ducing or enticing women to travel in interstate commerce to engage
in prostitution.''
The closest that Justice Scalia's stated fear has come to fruition
was in the Hawai'i Supreme Court decision in State v. Romano in
2007.52 Pame Romano was convicted of prostitution after the trial
court found that she had agreed to perform a "handjob" on an under-
cover policeman for $20.' The officer had responded to a massage
advertisement in a "Pennysaver" newspaper.14 He called the tele-
phone number, and Ms. Romano answered and agreed to meet him
in front of his hotel.5 From there, they then went up to his hotel
room.'56 The officer brought up the subject of a sex act, and, when
she agreed to perform a "handjob" for $20, she was arrested for pros-
titution.'5 7 Under the Hawai'i statute, prostitution includes the situa-
tion in which a person "engages in, or agrees or offers to engage in,
sexual conduct for a fee."'5 8 "Sexual conduct" includes "sexual con-
tact," which at the time was defined as, "[A]ny touching of the sexual
or intimate parts of a person not married to the actor by the person,
whether directly or through the clothing or other material intended
to cover the sexual or intimate parts."'5 9 Although the Hawai'i Su-
preme Court affirmed Ms. Romano's conviction, Chief Justice Levin-
son dissented, based on Lawrence as applied to the specific facts in the
case. Citing Justice Scalia's dissent, Chief Justice Levinson concluded
that Lawrence protects prostitution between consenting adults where
149. Id. at 1236.
150. State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
151. United States v. Thompson, 458 F. Supp. 2d 730, 733 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
152. State v. Romano, 155 P.3d 1102 (Haw. 2007).




157. Id. at 1104-05.
158. HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1200(1) (2014).
159. Id. §§ 712-1200(2) & 707-700 (2014).
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the entire transaction takes place in a private setting:
My analysis draws a clear line between purely private behavior be-
tween consenting adults-requiring demonstration of a compelling
state interest before criminal penalties may be imposed-and the
public realm, where the state retains broad power to impose
time/place/manner regulations .... [Tihis case does not implicate
public solicitation, streetwalking, or salacious advertising, which are
not private activities. Rather, the present record reflects that the
charged transaction could not conceivably have hurt anyone other
than Romano, which renders her conviction under [the statute]-
absent a showing of a compelling interest from the prosecution-a
violation of her federal and state constitutional rights to privacy as
articulated by Lawrence and by the drafters of article I, section 6.160
No other justice joined Chief Justice Levinson's dissent. Nor
have subsequent cases followed his rationale. In 2011, a court of ap-
peals in Texas rejected the notion that Lawrence protects adult "con-
sensual commercial sex" from criminal prosecution in Jackson v.
State.1 61 The factual basis of Sylvia Jackson's conviction is not set
forth in the decision, so it is impossible to tell whether the underlying
commercial transaction took place in private as it did in Romano. It
probably did not help Jackson's cause that she had previously been
convicted multiple times of prostitution and that she testified that
"she is not mentally ill, does not have a drug or alcohol problem, and
is a prostitute because she 'likes to shop and the idea of having money
in [her] pocket."'162
Courts have continued to unanimously reject the notion that
Lawrence protects prostitution from criminal prosecution. The most
recent case in this line, Commonwealth v. Tamen, decided by the Su-
preme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
in August 2014, cited not only some of the preceding authorities, but
also similar decisions of the federal district courts for the eastern dis-
trict of Louisiana, the northern district of Ohio, and the District of
Columbia.
163
In an ironic twist, American University Law Professor Jamie
Rankin testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 2014
160. State v. Romano, 155 P.3d 1102, 1124 n. 149 (Haw. 2007) (Levinson, CJ. dissent-
ing).
161. Jackson v. State, 2011 Tex. App. Lexis 4467 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011).
162. Id. at n.2.
163. Commonwealth v. Tamen, 2014 MP 8 (N. Mar. 1. 2014).
that the Supreme Court's decisions in Citizens United v. FEC6 and
McCutcheon v. FEC,165 striking down limitations on campaign contri-
butions on free speech grounds, mean that paying money for sex is a
form of free speech that cannot be criminalized.'66 Justice Scalia
joined the majority opinion in both cases.'67
VIII. MASTURBATION
"Then Judah said to Onan, 'Sleep with your brother's wif and fufil
your duty to her as a brother-in-law to raise up offipring of your brother.'
But Onan knew that the child would not be his; so whenever he slept with
his brother's wife, he spilled his semen on the ground to keep from providing
offipring for his brother. What he did was wicked in the Lord's sight; so the
Lord put him to death also. "-Genesis 3 8:8-1 .16
In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia is opaque as to which state
laws prohibiting masturbation he thought were undermined by the
majority's decision. Public or commercial masturbation may well be
subject to prosecution under any of a number of related statutes. As
noted above, in the Romano'69 case, an offer to perform, or actual per-
formance of, an act of masturbation on another person for money
may constitute prostitution, for which Lawrence does not constitute a
defense. In Georgia, such an act may constitute the separate offense
of "masturbation for hire.""17 An individual who masturbates in pub-
lic may be prosecuted for such offenses as "indecent exposure" in
Michigan,'7' or "exposure of a person" in New York,'72 or "public in-
decency" in Ohio.
73
164. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
165. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
166. Eric W. Dolan, Law Professor Tells Senators: If Money is Speech, Outlawing Prostitution
is Unconstitutional, RAW STORY (June 4, 2014), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/06/law-
professor-tells-senators-if-money-is-speech-outlawing-prostitution-is-unconstitutional/ (last
visited Mar. 14, 2015).
167. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310; McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
168. Genesis 38:8-10 (New International Version) (One might argue that the Lord was
compelling Onan to engage in incest. In any event, it is less than clear whether Onan's mortal
sin was the act of masturbation or the purposeful failure to impregnate his sister-in-law).
169. State v. Romano, 155 P.3d 1102, 1124n. 149 (Haw. 2007).
170. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-16 (2014).
171. People v. Vronko, 579 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Mich. App. 1998).
172. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 2014).
173. State v. Edmiston, 2010 Ohio 3413 (Ct. App. 2010).
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An individual who creates visual depictions of a minor masturbat-
ing, possesses uch visual depictions, or transmits such depictions is
subject to criminal prosecution under related provisions of the federal
child pornography laws. In United States v. Bach, the criminal defend-
ant who had been convicted of these crimes appealed, inter alia, alleg-
ing that his actions were "protected by the liberty and privacy com-
ponents of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment under
Lawrence v. Texas."'74 Relying on the Supreme Court's admonition in
Lawrence that that case "did not involve minors or others 'who might
be injured or coerced,"' the Court of Appeals readily distinguished
Bach's actions involving a minor who had been coerced from the
consensual private conduct between two adults at issue in Lawrence.'
75
Masturbation in the privacy of one's home does not appear to
have been the subject of state criminal laws in modern times, and
there is understandably a dearth of case law on the subject. It is, of
course, possible that a sex act committed in the privacy of the home
may end up being observed by public authorities. In this regard, it is
noteworthy that in Lawrence,'76 as in Bowers,'77 two men were engaged
in a private, non-commercial, consensual sex act when the police en-
tered the residence and arrested them. One supposes that if there
were a state criminal statute outlawing masturbation per se, and in the
unlikely event that a zealous prosecutor ever actually attempted to
prosecute someone for committing such a crime in the privacy of his
home where he could not be observed by either a minor or a member
of the public, Lawrence would indeed stand as a defense. Given the
apparent dearth of such laws and the understandable lack of state at-
tempts to enforce any such criminal prohibition, it is doubtful that
Lawrence would have any real practical impact on what Justice Scalia
evidently believes to be a proper subject of state criminal sanctions.
IX. BESTIALITY
"Anyone who has sexual relations with an animal is to he put to
death. "-Exodus 22:1917
174. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 628 (8th Cir. 2005).
175. Id. at628-29.
176. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003).
177. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
178. &odus 22:19 (New International Version).
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In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia opined that the case would
undercut, inter alia, state laws against bestiality.7 9 He apparently
equated consensual, non-commercial, private sex between two sen-
tient adults with sex between an adult and an animal. This logical
leap leads ineluctably to such metaphysical questions as: the age at
which a particular animal reaches adulthood, the mental capacity of
even an adult animal to give consent to a sex act with a human,
whether in the case of a pet or farm animal who is reliant on the hu-
man for food and shelter consent may ever have been said to have
been given truly voluntarily, and how exactly the adult is to ascertain
that the animal is of age and gives voluntary informed consent?
An individual who engages in a sexual encounter with an animal
may be subject to prosecution under state laws with a variety of
names. In Minnesota, such an act constitutes "bestiality."'80 In Vir-
ginia, it is a "crime against nature."'' In South Carolina, it is "bug-
gery."'82 In Kansas, it is a form of "sodomy."'83
For a variety of reasons, such crimes are rather infrequently re-
ported, and, when they are, the perpetrator may become the object of
public derision. In September 2012, a Florida farm worker, Carlos
Romero, was arrested for performing a sex act with a miniature don-
key named Doodle.'84 Bravely, if rather unwisely, his public defenders
actually accepted Justice Scalia's invitation to challenge Florida's bes-
tiality statute on the grounds that it deprived Romero of his "person-
al liberty and autonomy when it comes to private intimate activi-
ties.""'8 Shortly thereafter, however, Romero, presumably on the
advice of counsel, accepted a plea deal for a year's probation and a
$200 fine.'86
There appears to be only one reported case in which a defendant
actually took Justice Scalia's suggestion and tried to use the Lawrence
179. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590.
180. MINN. STAT. § 609.294 (2014). See State v. Bonynge, 450 N.W.2d 331 (Minn. App.
1990).
181. VA. CoI) ANN. § 18-2-361 (2006).
182. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-15-120 (1976).
183. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2 1-3505(a)(1) (2014).
184. Vishal Persaud, Lawyers for Donkey-Sex Suspect Challenge Law's Constitutionality,
OCAILA STAR-BANNER (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.gainesville.corm/aricle/20121211/
ARTICLES/121219923 (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
185. Id.
186. Fla. Man Who Pleaded Guilty to Sex with Donkey Is Back in Jail, KCCI, Oan. 18, 2013),
http://www.kcci.com/Fla-man-who-pleaded-guilty-is-back-in-jail/I 8186364.
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analogy as a basis to challenge his conviction for having had sex with
an animal up through the state's court system. Joshua Coman pled
guilty to misdemeanor criminal sodomy in violation of Kansas statute
after his former roommate found him with her pet Rottweiler dog "in
a compromising position." '87 At sentencing, the district court deter-
mined that Coman had to register under the Kansas Offender Regis-
tration Act (KORA). Coman appealed the sentence imposed to the
Court of Appeals, but also challenged the constitutionality of the
statute under both the United States and Kansas Constitutions. For a
variety of procedural reasons, the Court of Appeals declined to hear
his constitutional challenge and affirmed his sentence. Coman took
his challenge to the Kansas Supreme Court.
Coman had pled guilty to "criminal sodomy," which as set forth
in the pertinent section of the Kansas statute is, "Sodomy between
persons who are 16 or more years of age and members of the same
sex or between a person and an animal."'88 The Kansas Supreme
Court acknowledged that part of the statute "may be unconstitutional
under the narrow holding in Lawrence because it makes private ho-
mosexual conduct by two consenting adults a crime." '89
But that was not the part of the section of statute under which
Coman had been charged, i.e. the bestiality provision. He lacked
standing to challenge the homosexual acts prohibition under the stat-
ute, and Lawrence simply did not apply to bestiality laws.9 Given the
complete lack of equivalence between private adult consensual sex
and sex between a human and a non-human, this result is hardly sur-
prising.
X. OBSCENITY
"Nor should there be obscenity, fiolish talk or coarse joking, whicb are
out ofplace, but rather thanksgiving. "--Ephesians 5:4.''
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that Lawrence would undermine
state obscenity laws.192 The law on obscenity is of course complex,
187. State v. Coman, 273 P.3d 701, 703 (Kan. 2012).
188. KAN. SiAT1. ANN. § 21-3505(a)(1) (2014).
189. Coman, 273 P.3d at705.
190. Id. at 705-06. The Court nevertheless found that Cornan did not have to register
under KORA, given the crime to which he had pled guilty. Id. at 709.
191. Ephesians 5:4 (New International Version).
192. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003).
BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
sometimes to the point of inexplicability, and ever-changing in light
of new forms of media and communication. Normally, obscenity
challenges are focused on First Amendment issues rather than due
process, the prevailing argument in Lawrence. Thus, although the
Court has generally found that obscenity is not protected by the First
Amendment,193 in Stanley v. Georgia in 1969, it ruled that an individu-
al has a First Amendment right to possess obscene materials "in the
privacy of a person's own home."'94 As was the case with both Bowers
and Lawrence, the authorities had entered the defendant's residence
for other purposes and then discovered the activity deemed criminal
under state law.' 9 In words which presaged the Lawrence rationale,
the Stanley majority emphasized, "[A]lso fundamental is the right to
be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted gov-
ernmental intrusions into one's privacy. '196
As noted above, there was a failed effort to mount a Lawrence de-
fense to creation, dissemination and transmission of child pornogra-
phy in the Bach case.'97 Another ultimately unsuccessful effort to use
Lawrence (coupled with Stanley) to challenge the law in this area has
been reported in the federal court system. In United States v. Extreme
Associates, the government charged the defendants with nine counts of
violating federal obscenity statutes and one count of conspiracy to do
so.98 The defendants moved to dismiss, challenging the federal stat-
utes as violating the rights of liberty and privacy. As in some of the
cases striking down same-sex marriage prohibitions, the district court
judge cited Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence as a basis to strike
down the challenged statutes:
In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia opined that the holding in Lawrence
calls into question the constitutionality of the nation's obscenity laws,
193. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957). Non-obscene pornography is gen-
erally protected by the First Amendment. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973). But non-
obscene child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 764 (1982). Therefore, despite Stanley v. Georgia, possession of child pornography in
one's home is not protected by the First Amendment. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108
(1990). On the other hand, computer generated child pornography that is not obscene and is
created without using real children is protected. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234, 258 (2002).
194. Stanleyv. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
195. Id. at 558.
196. Id. at 564.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
198. United States v. Extreme Associates, 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 579 (W.D. PA 2005).
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among many other laws based on the state's desire to establish a
'moral code' of conduct.'99 It is reasonable to assume that these three
members of the Court came to this conclusion only after reflection
and that the opinion was not merely the result of over-reactive hy-
perbole by those on the losing side of the argument.00
But the defendants' victory was short-lived; a unanimous panel of
the Third Circuit reversed the district court.2"" The panel reasoned
that "the Supreme Court has decided that federal statutes regulating
the distribution of obscenity do not violate any constitutional right to
privacy," and Lawrence does not definitively overrule that line of cas-
es.2" 2 Similarly, Lawrence-based attacks on obscenity laws have also
failed in the Fifth Circuit 203 and the Eastern District of Missouri.
204
Understandably, litigation in this area of law continues to focus
on the First Amendment. In 2008, Justice Scalia penned the majority
opinion in United States v. Williams, upholding a provision of the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act against a First Amendment chal-
lenge.20 5 In Williams there was a secondary due process issue as to
whether the statute was void for vagueness, which was obviously not
based on Lawrence. The Court rejected that claim as well.
206
In 2009, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Federal
Communications Commission v. Fox Television, overruling a decision of
the Second Circuit that the FCC had failed to comply with procedur-
al requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act when it an-
nounced that a broadcast of a single "F-word" could violate the inde-
cency standard.0 7 Because the Second Circuit had not reached the
underlying First Amendment issue, the Supreme Court declined to
do so on appeal.208 When the case returned to the Court in 2012, Jus-
tice Scalia joined the Court's unanimous opinion that the FCC had
failed to give fair notice that it had changed its interpretation of inde-
cency to include fleeting expletives and brief non-frontal nudity, and
199 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
200. Id. at 590.
201. United States v. Extreme Associates, 431 F.3d 150, 151 (3rd Cir. 2005).
202. Id. at 161.
203. United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2006).
204. United States v. Gendron, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 125889 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
205. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
206. Id. at 305-06.
207. F.C.C. v. Fox Television, 556 U.S. 502, 509-22 (2009).
208. Id. at 529.
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thus its new standards as applied, were void for vagueness.20 9
In 2010, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in United States
v. Stevens, striking down under the First Amendment a federal statute
that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of cer-
tain depictions of animal cruelty.10 Again, there was no Lawrence is-
sue in the case.
It is fair to say that, to date, Lawrence has not affected the law of
obscenity (or child pornography or indecency) in any meaningful
way.
XI. A SCORE CARD AND THE FUTURE
It is impossible to make a final judgment on open-ended predic-
tions, as opposed to time-limited predictions (such as, "in the next
ten years") or date specific predictions (such as "the world will end on
(insert date here)"). The latter two types of predictions will be proven
or disproven with the passage of time. For example, radio preacher
Harold Camping predicted that the end of the world would take
place on May 21, 2011, and sadly many of his followers took dire ac-
tions in preparation for the imminent rapture. When that failed to
transpire on the date set, Camping recalculated and changed his pre-
diction to October 21, 2011. When that didn't happen, he gave up
predicting the end of the world.21'
Justice Scalia's dissents in Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor are open-
ended; they have no date certain or time frame for fruition. It is now
almost two decades since Romer was decided, more than a decade
since Lawrence, and a little more than a year since Windsor. Just be-
cause an open-ended prophecy has not been fulfilled in one, ten or
twenty years' time does not disprove its prescience. In 1896, Justice
Harlan, the sole dissenter in Ples.y v. Ferguson, upholding racial seg-
regation in railway cars, wrote, "In my opinion, the judgment this day
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision
made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case."'212 It took almost six
decades before Justice Harlan was vindicated and the Court aban-
209. F.C.C. v. Fox, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
210. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
211. Robert D. McFadden, Harold Camping, Dogged Forecaster of the End of the World,
Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/
us/harold-camping-radio-entrepreneur-who-predicted-worlds-end-dies-at-
92.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
212. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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doned Plesy's pernicious doctrine of separate-but-equal as it applied
to public education in Brown v. Board of Education.
13
With these caveats in mind, one may sum up how Justice Scalia's
"parade of horribles" have fared to date. Same-sex marriage is an is-
sue currently riveting the nation. An almost unanimous federal bench
has struck down state prohibitions on same-sex marriage based large-
ly on Windsor, and it is highly likely that the Court will address this
issue in the foreseeable future. Polygamy, insofar as legal recognition
of plural marriage, is not the law in any state, and even if the "Sister
Wives" decision is upheld on appeal, it will not mean legal recogni-
tion of plural marriage. Adultery remains a crime in many jurisdic-
tions, but sensibly is seldom prosecuted. Fornication laws, likewise
seldom prosecuted for obvious reasons, still exist in some states, but
admittedly are highly suspect post-Lawrence. Adult incest prohibi-
tions remain in place and have thus far been upheld. Prostitution is a
crime in all states, although Nevada permits local options (except in
Clark County where Las Vegas is situated) for licensed brothels.2t 4
Thus far, constitutional attacks on prostitution statutes have proven
unavailing. Masturbation conducted in private, without a commercial
component or coercion or the involvement of minors, is beyond the
scope of civil or criminal law, as well it should be. Bestiality is a sel-
dom prosecuted crime, which has been upheld against rare unconsti-
tutional attack. Obscenity laws are frequently evolving and have
sometimes fallen to constitutional challenges, but not under any the-
ory based on Romer, Lawrence, or Windsor.
Now that the Court is poised to rule directly on state prohibi-
tions on entry into and recognition of same-sex marriage, will Justice
Scalia prove to have been prescient in predicting the outcome? While
it is admittedly hard, and probably foolish, to try to "read the tea
leaves," certainly the trilogy of Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor must
give great hope to advocates of same-sex marriage. In each case, the
proponents of gay rights won a clear victory for their position. And,
Hollingswnrth v. Pery (the companion case to Windsor), while not dc-
213. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
214. NEV. RiV. STAT. § 269.175 (2014) authorizes boards of county commissioners to
license "disorderly houses and houses of ill fame" in any unincorporated town. But § 244.345(8)
prohibits a license board from issuing a license for the purpose of operating "a house of ill fame
or repute or any other business employing any person for the purpose of prostitution" in a
county whose population is 700,000 or more, thereby prohibiting legal prostitution in Las Ve-
gas (a/k/a "Sin City") and the surrounding Clark County.
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cided on the merits of the challenge to California's Proposition 8,
must be counted as a victory for gay rights advocates, as the Court's
finding of the lack of a case or controversy had the effect of reinstat-
ing same-sex marriage in that State.21 All this constitutes a marked
about-face from the Court's 1972 summary dismissal of the appeal in
Baker v. Nelson, where two men had alleged a federal constitutional
right to be married, the Court unanimously finding the "want of a
substantial federal question.
' 216
Surely there is language in the various opinions of the Justices in
Windsor that can be read to support or undermine the notion of a
federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage. The majority opin-
ion repeatedly emphasized that regulation of civil marriage is a tradi-
tional function of the States. "The recognition of civil marriages is
central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents and
citizens .... Consistent with this allocation of authority, the Federal
Government through our history, has deferred to state-law decisions
with respect to domestic relations.' 217 Yet, the majority did not ex-
plicitly decide the case on federalism grounds, but rather on due pro-
cess and equal protection.1 8
While the Windsor majority opined that "'discriminations of an
unusual kind' especially require careful consideration, ' 219 nevertheless
the majority opinion was ultimately silent on the standard of review
applicable to a statute which discriminates against homosexuals.220
Furthermore, as noted, the majority opinion, by its own terms, was
limited to marriages recognized as lawful under state law.2
One might posit that Justice Scalia could feel bound by the doc-
trine of stare decisis to follow the rationale of Lawrence and Windsor
and his own analysis of those decisions to vote that the United States
Constitution guarantees same-sex couples the right to marry. But
given his dissent in Windsor, in which he surely did not feel bound by
the majority's rationale in Lawrence, this is a consummation hardly to
be expected. On the other hand, since Justice Scalia actually provided
the fifth vote in Hollingworth to reinstate same-sex marriage in our
215. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
216. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
217. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013).
218. Id. at 2693.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2716-19 (Alito, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at2696.
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most populous state, might he surprise the legal world again? And,
why did he provide such an explicit roadmap for applying the Law-
rence rationale to state same-sex marriage bans if not to assist the op-
ponents of those bans?
If the Court finds a constitutional right for same-sex couples to
marry, that would, temporarily at least, end the legal dispute, alt-
hough no doubt there would be calls for a constitutional amendment
to overturn the result.
222
If the Court upholds state same-sex marriage bans, then the law
on same-sex marriage will remain similar to the law on first cousin
marriage, with the states being divided on the issue.2 3 Should that
happen, some same-sex couples-perhaps those who are younger and
more mobile-may be expected to "vote with their feet" and move
from jurisdictions where they cannot marry to jurisdictions where
they can.
But other couples, like Windsor and her longtime partner Thea
Spyer, may opt to get married in a jurisdiction that permits such mar-
riages, without intending to reside there . 24 This will implicate the
second question on which the Court has granted cert: whether states
are required by the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize same-sex
marriages validly licensed and performed out-of-state. If the Court
answers that question in the affirmative, then there will be no conflict
of laws or choice of laws problem. But, should the Court answer that
question in the negative, such couples may well find themselves in the
anomalous position of being considered married in a state where they
don't reside, but not married where they do reside. This could lead to
myriad complexities involving such matters as ownership of property,
health and life insurance coverage, Social Security benefits, and state
and federal taxation.
225
What does the future of family law in the United States hold for
the various other "horribles" raised by Justice Scalia? There appears
to be no credible legal movement for the legalization of state-
recognized polygamy, and the polygamy laws will continue to be en-
222. See, e.g., the proposed "Marriage Protection Amendment," HJ. RFS. 51, l13th
Cong. (2013-2014).
223. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Regarding Marriages Be-
tween First Cousins, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/state-laws-regarding-
marriages-between-first-cousi.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
224. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
225. See Robert E. Rains, The Legal Status of Same-Sex Married Couples in Pennsylvania f-
ter the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the DOMA Case, 85 PBA Quarterly 1 (2014).
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forced periodically in egregious or notorious circumstances. We may
expect adultery to remain a proper subject of domestic relations law,
but at most to be on the outer fringes of criminal law even where
such a crime remains on the books. Anti-fornication criminal statutes
will remain for some time on the books in a dwindling number of
states, but not really enforced except perhaps in a deal where some-
one charged with a more serious sexual offense is offered a plea.
Adult incest will remain a crime, although the states will continue to
be at odds as to the degree of consanguinity necessary to constitute
the offense, and although it will be seldom prosecuted. Indeed, even
the European Court of Human Rights, which is generally viewed as
being more "liberal" than the U.S. Supreme Court, has fairly recently
upheld the right of Germany to criminalize adult incest.22" What
about legalization of prostitution, as some have called for,227 and as is
already the case in many countries around the world?228 It seems
highly unlikely that our courts would initiate such a change, but some
states may eventually take baby steps and follow Nevada's lead of al-
lowing local options. Masturbation in private, not for money, not in-
volving coercion or children, will properly remain outside the scope
of state regulation. Bestiality will remain a crime, although seldom
prosecuted and although some may deem its perpetrators to be more
in need of psychiatric help than incarceration.229 Obscenity laws and
related statutes will continue to evolve in a world where texting
quickly brought forth "sexting" and where anyone with a smart
phone or access to the internet can readily become a pornographer.
Challenges to obscenity and related statutes will likewise continue,
but are unlikely to be premised on a theory arising out of Romer,
Lawrence, or Windsor.
226. Case of Stibing v. Germany, E.C.H.R. Application no. 43547/08, decided
24/09/2012.
227. See Amanda Swysgood, U.N. Commission Calls for Legalizing Prostitution Worldwide,
CNSNEWS.COM (uly 23, 2012), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/un-commission-calls-
legalizing-prostitution-worldwide. (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Legalize Prostitution Now, TilE
DAILY CALIFORNIAN, (uly 28, 2014), www.dailycal.org/2014/07/28Aegalize-prostitution-now.
(last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
228. See 100 Countries and Their Prostitution Policies, PROCON.ORG,
http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceD=000772 (last visited March 14,
2015).
229. The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V), list zoophilia as an "Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder,"
302.89 (F65.89). But, just because a disorder is listed in the DSM does not mean that acting out
that disorder cannot be the basis of criminal prosecution.
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But, ultimately, this author's crystal ball may be no clearer than
Justice Scalia's. The law evolves. What is unimaginable today may
become imaginable or even acceptable and constitutionally protected
with the passage of time.
To the Supreme Court in 1972, the concept of a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage was so unthinkable that it summarily dis-
missed the appeal in the first same-sex marriage case to reach it,
Baker v. Nelson.230 In the ensuing years, the Court has issued three de-
cisions on the merits that are protective of gay rights, Romer, Law-
rence, and Windsor, to the point of striking down in Windsor the pro-
vision in the federal Defense of Marriage Act barring federal
recognition of state recognized same-sex marriages. And, in a fourth
case, Hollingsworth, decided on standing grounds, the Court effective-
ly reinstated same-sex marriage in California. Whatever one's posi-
tion on gay rights issues, it is undeniable that the Court has revolu-
tionized this area of law in a remarkably brief period of time.
The author grew up in the segregated South in a state where in-
terracial marriages were outlawed, the crime of miscegenation was
actually prosecuted, and a state court judge could defend that legal
situation as having been divinely ordained.23' Today, the President of
the United States, who has been elected twice, is the product of an
interracial marriage, which, had it taken place in the author's home
state, would have been void and criminal.
What does all this hold for the future of family law in the United
States? Changes are bound to come. Only time will tell what exactly
they will be. And, whether they will ultimately be good or bad for
families will, as always, remain in the eye of the beholder.
230. United States v. Extreme Associates, 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 579 (-.D. PA 2005).
231. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
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